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PROHIBITION IN FLORIDA
VicroR 0. WELE AND WILLIAM S. BELcm=

The writ of prohibition is seldom sought by the average lawyer.
Probably not over ten percent of the Florida Bar will encounter such
a proceeding in a lifetime of practice.
"There is no legal remedy, no common law writ, of which so much
that is erroneous has been written, in text books and in certain classes
of judicial decisions in America, as that of the remedy by writ of
prohibition."' With this pertinent comment in mind we attempt to
present a brief analysis of the extraordinary writ of prohibition as it is
employed in Florida, based on a reading of every Florida case on the
subject. Not all have been cited; many have been omitted because of
their extreme brevity or because of their enigmatic nature. Wherever
possible, the cases have been placed in their proper niches in the
jurisprudence of this extraordinary writ; but ofttimes conflicting
decisions make this orderly arrangement impossible. In such instances the discrepancies are noted.
HISTORY

2
The writ of prohibition early became a part of the common law.
It was the King's prerogative writ and originally issued only out of
the Court of King's Bench, but later the right to its use was extended
to the Courts of Chancery, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. 3 The
present Florida Constitution grants the power to issue writs of
5
prohibition to both the Supreme Court 4 and the several circuit courts.
1
Cooper, The Remedy by Prohibition in Flcrida as Affected by Some Recent
Supreme Court Cases, etc., 2 FLA. STATE BAR Ass'N L.J. 6, 11 (1928). It is
interesting to note in passing that the author of this note had been an unsuccessful applicant for a writ of prohibition before the Supreme Court of Florida shortly
before the publication of this article.
2
See Wo.Ms. , THE LAw 288 (1949) for an interesting discussion of the
use of the writ by common law courts to prohibit ecclesiastical courts from infringing upon the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

32 BL. CoMM *936 (4th ed., Cooley, 1899).
4

FLA. CONST. Art. V, §5.

5FLA. CONST. Art. V, §11. Under the Florida Constitution of 1868 the power
to issue a writ of prohibition as an original proceeding did not belong to the
circuit courts, and the writ could be issued by them only ancillary to a juris[546]
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The procedural steps, however, are regulated by both statute and
court rule. 7 Because of the phrasing of the Florida Constitution,
which guarantees to the people of this state the common law writ of
prohibition, the substantive law controlling the scope and propriety
of the remedy is peculiarly within the province of the common law,
and any attempt by the Legislature to modify these features of the
writ is without the pale of the Legislature's constitutional powers. 8
Blackstone defined prohibition as a writ 9
"... directed to the judges and parties of a suit in any inferior

court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof,
upon a suggestion, that either the cause originally, or some
collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court."
This definition was adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in a
very early case.1 0 It has been limited in subsequent decisions by
removing the necessity of joining as parties all litigants before the
lower tribunal"1 and has been extended by including within the writs
scope the judicial or quasi-judicial functions of administrative
agencies.1 2
JURISDICTION

The basic question in every prohibition case is one of jurisdiction,
and the writ will not issue if the inferior tribunal has the requisite
diction already acquired, Senger Mfg. Co. v. Spratt, 20 Fla. 122 (1883).
6FLA. STAT. §§80.05 et seq. (1949).
7

F.A. C.L.R. 56.

sState ex rel. Swearingen iv. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444
(1920); Sherlock v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 93 (1879).
92 BL. Comm. 937 (4th ed., Cooley, 1899).
'0Sherlock v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 93, 95 (1879).
11
Burkhart v. Circuit Court, 146 Fla. 457, 1 So.2d 872 (1941); State ex rel.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 175 (1939). It would
appear from the holdings of the Florida Court that the writ is no longer required
to be directed to the litigants, who ordinarily are merely permissive, not necessary,
parties to the alternative writ. But see discussion of necessary and permissive
parties, p. 568 infra.
12
State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 125 Fla. 562, 170 So. 311 (1936); State
ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444 (1920).
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jurisdiction1 3 despite the fact that it may have committed or be about
to commit reversible error. 1 4 As the Supreme Court of Florida so
aptly remarked in a recent decision, "Jurisdiction naturally includes
15
the power to err .....
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, by way of dictum,
that even though the lower tribunal may be acting without or in
excess of its jurisdiction the remedy by prohibition is not a "writ of
1
right" but is subject to the sound discretion of the superior court. 6
Despite these frequent expressions obiter, however, our research
has failed to unearth a single case in which the Florida Court denied
the writ solely in an exercise of discretion. On the contrary, the
reports are filled with decisions awarding a peremptory writ of prohibition, based upon either a lack or an excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the lower court, without comment as to the adequacy of any
7
other remedy or recognition of the discretionary nature of the writ.
Another general principle, often cited in Florida cases but never
employed as solely decisive of a cause, is the rule that prohibition will
not lie when the petitioner has another plain, complete, and adequate
remedy available to him.'" In the cases in which this principle has
l 3 State ex rel. Alfred E. Destin Co. v. Heffernan, 47 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1950);
Civil Ct. of Record v. State ex rel. Leff, 159 Fla. 716, 82 So.2d 602 (1947);
Chapman v. State ex iel. Carlton, 152 Fla. 183, 11 So.2d 835 (1943); State
ex rel. Palmer v. Hewitt, 116 Fla. 140, 156 So. 286 (1984); Hewitt v. State
ex rel. Palmer, 108 Fla. 835, 146 So. 578 (1983); State ex rel. Moody v. Baker,
20 Fla. 616 (1884).
14E.g., Lorenzo v. Murphy, 159 Fla. 639, 32 So.2d 481 (1947); State ex iel.
Schwarz v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 187, 194 So. 318 (1940); State ex rel. Glass v.
Sebring, 117 Fla. 788, 158 So. 446 (1935); State ex rel. Florida W. & N.R.R.
v. Chillingworth, 98 Fla. 529, 124 So. 20 (1929); State ex tel. McCallum v.
Smith, 82 Fla. 476, 14 So. 43 (1893).
15White v. State ex rel. Johnson, 160 Fla. 965, 966, 37 So.2d 580, 581 (1948).
16 See, e.g., Burkhart v. Circuit Court, 146 Fla. 457, 462, 1 So.2d 872, 874
(1941); State ex rel. Washburn v. Hutchins, 101 Fla. 778, 777, 185 So. 298,
299 (1981); State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 530,
84 So. 444, 445 (1920).
17 Hutchins v. State ex rel. Ramseyer, 131 Fla. 826, 180 So. 48 (1988) (lack
of jurisdiction); State ex rel. Goodson v. Sandier, 127 Fla. 89, 172 So. 480
(1937) (excess of jurisdiction); State ex rel. Padgett v. Civil Ct. of Record,
113 Fla. 385, 151 So. 498 (1933); State ex rel. Crabtree v. Porter, 111 Fla. 621,
149 So. 610 (1983); State ex rel. Padgett v. Circuit Court, 110 Fla. 46, 148 So.
522 (1933); Joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 883, 143 So. 145 (1982); South Fla.
Amusement & Devel. Co. v. Blanton, 97 Fla. 885, 116 So. 869 (1928).
l 8 The Supreme Court has indicated in several cases remedies that are adequate
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been expressed, the Court has uniformly found that the lower court
was acting within its jurisdiction.' 9
A quite different situation arises when the Court is convinced that
petitioner is without another adequate remedy. In such instances
the Florida decisions indicate that the writ becomes one of right
rather than one of discretion. This principle was expressed by Mr.
Justice Davis in his concurring opinion in Blanton -1. State ex rel.
Biscayne Beach Theatre, Inc.:20
"Wherever there is anything in the nature of the action or
proceeding that makes it apparent that the rights of the party
litigant applying for a writ of prohibition cannot be adequately
protected by other remedy than through the exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction, it is not only proper to grant the writ
of prohibition, but it should be granted."
It is submitted, then, that in practical effect the Supreme Court
decisions prescribe issuance of prohibition as a "writ of right" whenever an inferior tribunal is acting without jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the petitioner, faced with injury, lacks another adequate
remedy.
A petitioner is under no burden to call the attention of the lower
tribunal to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction by a plea to the
2
jurisdiction; this practice is merely procedural, not jurisdictional. '
and preclude the use of prohibition, see, e.g., Jacques v. Blanton, 188 Fla. 479,
480, 182 So. 778 (1988) (writ of error or certiorari); State ex rel. Cacciatore
v. Drumbright, 116 Fla. 496, 500, 156 So. 721, 728 (1984) (writ of error and
appeal); In re Newkirk, 114 Fla. 552, 554, 154 So. 828, 824 (1984) (bill of
review); Eberhardt v. Barker, 104 Fla. 585, 540, 140 So. 688, 634 (1982)
(motion, trial, appeal, and habeas corpus); State ex rel. Meredith v. Trustees,
102 Fla. 219, 228, 185 So. 781, 783 (1981) (interlocutory certiorari). But cf.
State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 121 Fla. 822, 827, 164 So. 872, 878 (1985),
in which the Court in granting a writ of prohibition said, "If petitioner had
elected to go to trial he could have pleaded the giving of such testimony in
bar of the prosecution."
20 See note 16 supra.
20106 Fla. 272, 278, 143 So. 226, 227 (1982); see Harrison v. Murphy, 182

Fla. 579, 584, 181 So. 886, 389 (1988).

21
E.g., State ex rel. Garrett v. Whitehurst, 122 Fla. 484, 165 So. 691 (1986);
State ex iel. Anderson v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91, 118 So. 702 (1927); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. White, 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160 (1898). But of. State ex iel. Landis
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In an otherwise proper case, prohibition, unlike its affirmative

counterpart, mandamus, will not be denied merely because the
suggestion asks the court to prohibit more than is proper. The writ
will instead be framed and issued to restrain only the excess of
2
jurisdiction. 2
NATURE AND SCOPE

The writ of prohibition will operate to restrain the performance of
23
only those acts that are judicial or quasi-judicial in their nature.
24
2 5_
Purely executive or legislative functions are not amenable to the
writ. The basis for determining just what constitutes a judicial or
quasi-judicial act or function is nebulous. Some states hold that any
act performed by a public official requiring the use of discretion is a
judicial act,2 6 but the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted a rule
2
both stricter 2 and less certain by announcing that it takes its stand 8

"... with those courts that limit the use of this writ to cases
where there is no doubt about its applicability, rather than to
reach out for more power by extending it to commissions, boards

v. Atkinson, 102 Fla. 1092, 186 So. 723 (1931); State ex rel. Sanford Herald
v. Wright, 98 Fla. 461, 124 So. 18 (1929).
22
State ex rel. Garrett v. Whitehurst, 122 Fla. 484, 165 So. 691 (1936);
State ex rel. Burr v. Whitney, 66 Fla. 24, 68 So. 299 (1913); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. White, 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160 (1898).
23
Owens v. Bond, 83 Fla. 495, 91 So. 686 (1922); State ex rel. Swearingen
v. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444 (1920).
24
Owens v. Bond, 83 Fla. 495, 91 So. 686 (1922).
25
State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444
(1920).
26
E.g., People ex rel. Devery v. Jerome, 36 Misc. 256, 78 N.Y. Supp. 806
(Sup. Ct. 1901), cited in Owens v. Bond, 83 Fla. 495, 91 So. 686 (1922).
27
"The exercise of some authority, discretion or judgment may be incident
or necessary to the performance of administrative or ministerial duties; but such
authority, discretion or judgment is subject to judicial review, and is not among
the powers of government that the constitution separates into departments,"
State v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 633, 47 So. 969, 975 (1908).
28
Owens v. Bond, 83 Fla. 495, 499, 91 So. 686, 688 (1922); accord, State
ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330. 190 So. 59 (1939) (prohibition directed
to State Board of Medical Examiners); Matthews v. State ex rel. St. Andrews
Bay Transp. Co., 111 Fla. 587, 149 So. 648 (1933) (writ directed to Railroad
Commission); State ex rel. Anderson v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91, 118 So. 702 (1927)
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and officers that are not seeking to perform functions clearly
judicial or quasi judicial."
Prohibition lies to restrain the prosecution of a cause, whether
criminal 20 or civil,30 whenever the statute of limitations applies or
some other similar absolute bar to the maintenance of the cause exists.
In the event of dispute over the facts alleged to constitute the bar,
prohibition vil not lie; the lower court has jurisdiction to determine
the plea, and the correctness of its ruling cannot be reviewed by
prohibition. 3 ' Neither will it lie if the reinstatement of a cause after
dismissal for lack of prosecution is within the discretion of the court
and involves both fact and law rather than law alone.3 2
Prohibition also lies to restrain the prosecution of criminal causes
in which more than the statutory number of continuances 33 have
been granted over defendant's objections; 34 and the petitioner need
not file a motion for discharge and procure a ruling thereon prior to
seeking relief by prohibition. 35
As the circuit courts of Florida are courts of general jurisdiction,
questions involving the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances are
properly presented before them. Thus, in a case involving the constitutionality of certain statutory proceedings, prohibition directed to
the circuit court is improper even though the petitioner has no other
adequate remedy.36 A well-recognized exception to this general rule
arises, however, if the statute attacked as unconstitutional attempts to
(State Board of Law Examiners subject to prohibition).
29

State ex rel. Melson v. Peeler, 107 Fla. 615, 146 So. 188 (1988) (although
here the Court denied prohibition because it found that the statute had not run).
30
Scarlett v. Frederick, 147 Fla. 407, 3 So.2d 165 (1941). The limitation
consisted of the alleged lapse of three years in a pending suit without pleadings
filed or other action taken. The Court denied prohibition because it found some
action
had actually been taken within the three-year period.
31
State ex rel. Miami v. Knight, 188 Fla. 874, 189 So. 425 (1939) (city
pleaded failure of plaintiff to give the sixty days' notice of intention to sue as
required by the city charter).
32
State ex rel. Jacksonville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Gray, 180 Fla. 859,
177 So. 849 (1937) (lower court dismissed a suit under the 8-year non-prosecution statute and reinstated it on petition filed within 6 months thereafter, after
sustaining a demurrer to the defendant's answer to the petition to reinstate).
33FLA. STAT. §915.01 (1949).
34
Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1982).
35
Dickoff v. Dewell, 152 Fla. 240, 9 So.2d 804 (1942).
3
GCrill v. State Road Dep't, 96 Fla. 110, 117 So. 795 (1928).
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confer jurisdiction of the subject matter on the inferior tribunal.17
The Supreme Court has indicated, by way of dictum, that this exception would extend to a case involving an attempt to grant to the
lower court by an unconstitutional statute jurisdiction over the person
38
of a defendant.
The writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a disqualified judge from proceeding in a cause. 39 Such disqualification
may be due to an invalid executive order directing a circuit judge to
proceed to another circuit,40 to failure of a judge to recuse himself
after presentment of statutorily sufficient suggestion of disqualification and supporting affidavit, 41 or to an attempt by a judge to set
aside an order disqualifying himself after the time for setting it aside
has passed. 42 Indication by the respondent judge in his return that
he has no intention of sitting in the cause, however, operates as a
43
complete bar to award of the writ.
When a rule nisi is issued, upon a suggestion for a writ of prohibition based upon the alleged disqualification of a particular circuit
judge, the statutory supersedeas 44 suspends his power to act further
in the suit; but it does not affect the jurisdiction of the circuit court,
37

State ex rel. York v. Beckham, 160 Fla. 810, 86 So.2d 769 (1948) (declaring
unconstitutional a statute that attempted to confer a jurisdiction on the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County which was not of uniform operation in each county of Florida); State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 388, 126
So. 374 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute purporting to allow suits by
contractors against the State Road Department).
38
State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 888, 839, 126 So. 875, 376 (1980).
39
E.g., Peacock v. Frederick, 125 Fla. 414, 170 So. 129 (1986); Dickenson
v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); State ex rel. Bank of America v.
Rowe, 96 Fla. 277, 118 So. 5 (1928).
40Cobb v. State ex rel. Pitchford, 148 Fla. 149, 8 So.2d 855 (1941).
The
Florida Court disposed of this problem in a very practical way in State ex rel.
Johnston v. Adkins, 143 Fla. 891, 197 So. 526 (1940), by granting the rule
nisi in prohibition returnable in 15 days, with leave to the respondent judge to
notify the governor of the defects in the order and to make any subsequent or
supplemental order a part of his return.
41
E.g., Miami Retreat Foundation v. Holt, 48 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1950); State
ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 618 (1939); Gates v. Rowe, 96
Fla. 298, 118 So. 10 (1928).
But see FLA. STAT. §38.02 (1949), which may
modify this general rule.
42
State ex rel. Harrison v. Whitehurst, 108 Fla. 465, 146 So. 589 (1988).
43
Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 846, 181 So. 318 (1980).
44

FLA. STAT.

§80.07 (1949).
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and accordingly another judge may continue with the cause.45
The general rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that prohibitioffn
will issue to restrain a court from proceeding with the trial of a cause
in which it has erroneously denied a change of venue requested as a
matter of right.4 6 The Florida Supreme Court has ruled to this effect
in two cases, 47 and yet to exactly the opposite effect in two other
48
cases.
Prohibition does not lie to prevent alleged second jeopardy. The
defense of former jeopardy should be presented by plea, and an
49
adverse ruling may be subject to an appeal.
Prohibition will lie when there is a total want of service, 50 or when
the defendant has been served with process while immune from
service because in attendance at a court hearing, 51 or when the
manner of service is defective. 52 Prohibition will not lie, however,
53
when the defect in the service is merely an incorrect return date,
45

State ex rel. Bryan v. Albritton, 111 Fla. 142, 149 So. 60 (1933).
6E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1085, 89 S.W.2d 723
(1935); People ex rel. Burk v. District Court, 60 Colo. 1, 152 Pac. 149 (1915);
State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).
47
Eberhardt v. Barker, 104 Fla. 535, 140 So. 633 (1932); State ex rel.
Anderson v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91, 113 So. 702 (1927).
45
Gay v. Ogilvie, 47 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950); State ex rel. Floral City Phosphate Co. v. Hocker, 33 Fla. 283, 14 So. 186 (1894).
49
State ex rel. Johnson v. Anderson, 37 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1948); State ex rel.
Cacciatore v. Drumbright, 116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721 (1934). Contra: State
ex rel. Dato v. Himes, 134 Fla. 175, 184 So. 244 (1938), in which the Supreme
Court concluded its opinion with the novel and puzzling announcement, "A writ
absolute in prohibition is awarded to the relators, but will not be issued unless
it is necessary to do so." Query: By whom and how will the question of
necessity be raised or decided? For a detailed analysis of double jeopardy in
Florida see Note, 2 U. or FLA. L. Rv. 250 (1949).
50
State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940);
Grady v. Electric Bond & Share Co., 137 Fla. 793, 189 So. 18 (1939) (by
inference); see Cobb v. State ex rel. Homickel, 134 Fla. 315, 326, 187 So.
151, 155 (1938); State ex iel. Gore v. Chillingworth, 126 Fla. 645, 652, 171
So. 649, 652 (1936); State ex rel. Neel v. Love, 110 Fla. 91, 92, 148 So. 208
(1933); State ex rel. Pearson v. Trammell, 124 Fla. 543, 545, 169 So. 45, 46
(1936) (dissenting opinion). Contra: Curtis v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 853, 132
So. 677 (1931).
51
State ex rel. Cx v. Adams, 148 Fla. 426, 4 So.2d 457 (1941); see State
ex rel.
Ivey v. Circuit Court, 51 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1951).
2
5 Speight v. Home, 101 Fla. 101, 133 So. 574 (1931).
58 State ex rel. Reynolds Constr. Co. v. Hendry, 37 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1948);
4
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nor can it be used to test the constitutionality of an act authorizing a
54
particular type of service.
Prohibition as a substitute for habeas corpus is mentioned elsewhere. 55 Prohibition of habeas corpus proceedings is rare. It has
been granted when the application for writ of habeas corpus in a
lower court is made after the defendant has been tried and convicted
and the conviction affirmed on appeal, inasmuch as the lower court
6
thereafter has no further authority except to follow the mandate.
While prohibition will not lie to prohibit the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, it may under special circumstances be used to forbid
improper discharge of a prisoner. 57 It will not lie to prevent the
lower court in habeas corpus proceedings from erroneously proceeding
to take testimony as to probable cause, since if this is error the remedy
is by appeal.58
Prohibition ordinarily will not lie to prevent further proceedings
in a contempt matter, as there is available another adequate remedy,
habeas corpus, if the respondent is improperly adjudicated in contempt., 9 Of course it will not lie in any event if the petition clearly
shows that a contempt was actually committed, 0 although it has been
granted in instances in which an inspection of the record revealed
that the facts were undisputed and that the acts charged could not
Seaboard Realty Co. v. Seaboard AII-Fla. Ry., 91 Fla. 670, 108 So. 675 (1926).
54
State ex rel. Rheinauer v. Malone, 40 Fla. 129, 23 So. 575 (1898). But see
note 38 supra.
55
See notes 18 supra and 59 infra.
56
State ex rel. Gibbs v. Circuit Court, 140 Fla. 378, 191 So. 699 (1939).
57
State ex rel. Perky v. Browne, 105 Fla. 631, 142 So. 247 (1932), incorrectly
citing as authority Frederick v. Rowe, 105 Fla. 193, 140 So. 915 (1932). In
the latter case the question of the use of prohibition to restrain further proceedings in a habeas corpus suit was raised but not answered.
58
State ex rel. Gibbs v. Hobson, 135 Fla. 335, 185 So. 147 (1938). The
former method of review, namely, writ of error, has been abolished, FA. STAT.
§59.01(3) (1949).
59
State ex rel. Hamilton v. Trammell, 146 Fla. 10, 200 So. 82 (1941); State
ex rel. McGregor v. Peacock, 113 Fla. 816, 152 So. 616 (1934). Query: Is
habeas corpus an adequate remedy when to avail himself of it petitioner must
first submit to the ignominy of incarceration?
6
OEx parte Peaden, 88 Fla. 273, 102 So. 160 (1924); cf. State ex rel. Parks v.
H. T. Poindexter & Sons M'dse Co., 149 Fla. 765, 7 So.2d 452 (1941) (although
this case was decided on the theory that the lower court bad jurisdiction to
require the performance of the act the nonperformance of which was a basis
for the contempt proceeding).
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be contemptuous,"1 as well as in contempt proceedings clearly in
2
excess of the court's jurisdiction.
Prohibition will not issue unless there is some matter actually
pending upon which the lower court threatens to act without jurisdiction.0 3 To act in excess of jurisdiction is to act without it, of
course. In this sense the writ is preventive, not remedial.6 4 If the
act complained of has already been performed and the cause terminated by the inferior tribunal, the writ will not lie, even though the
disposition of the cause was accomplished after service of a rule nisi
by the superior court.65 Accordingly the writ will be denied when
the question of jurisdiction has become moot because of facts occurring or brought to the attention of the higher court after issuance of
the rule nisi.10 The Supreme Court has held in this connection that
prohibition will not issue for the sole purpose of establishing a principle to govern other cases;( 7 but in a moot cause containing questions
properly presented and involving public duties and authority of
general interest to the public the superior tribunal may in its discretion
retain the cause and render an opinion thereon. 8
As a general principle the writ of prohibition is, as previously
stated, preventive rather than remedial; but the court may, in issuing
the writ, order some affirmative act so as to end effectively the
69
litigation against which prohibition is sought.
61 State ex tel. Everette v. Petteway, 131 Fla. 516, 179 So. 666 (198), and
185 Fla. 757, 185 So. 619 (.1939) (lower court improperly threatened contempt
proceedings); State ex rel. Gary v. Davis, 83 Fla. 422, 91 So. 267 (1922) (writ
issued on the theory that the lower court's order, which the relator was accused
of violating, was not valid). It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these
decisions with those cited in note 59 supra.
02
State ex rel. Brooks v. Freeland, 103 Fla. 663, 138 So. 27 (1931).
03
An abuse of trust and power by an inferior court will not be presumed,
State ex rel. Wofford v. Circuit Court, 41 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1949); State ex rel.
Sanford Herald v. Wright, 98 Fla. 461, 124 So. 18 (1929).
64State ex tel. Jennings v. Frederick, 137 Fla. 773, 189 So. 1 (1939).
65Ibld.
6
6North v. Chillingworth, 42 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1949); Merchants Bank & Trust
Co. v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 846, 131 So. 318 (1930); State ex rel. Anderson v. Love,
91 Fla. 1024, 109 So. 197 (1926).
67State ex rel. Jennings v. Frederick, 137 Fla. 773, 189 So. 1 (1939).
68
joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 143 So. 306 (1932); State ex rel. Railroad
Comm'rs v. Southern Tel. & Constr. Co., 65 Fla. 67, 61 So. 119 (1913).
69Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1932).
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Although the practice of filing a suggestion for a writ of prohibition
in the name of the State of Florida on the relation of petitioner is
often employed, the state is not a necessary party.70 Furthermore, the
plaintiff in the suit below is not a necessary party unless the nature
of his rights therein makes it essential that he be given an opportunity
to plead to the rule to show cause. 71 In such event he may, upon
demonstrating this essentiality to the issuing court, have the rule to
72
show cause amended so as to make him a party.
The practice in Florida courts is set forth in Sections 80.06-80.12
of Florida Statutes 1949, Florida Common Law Rule 56, and Florida
Supreme Court Rules of Practice 27 and 29.
These rules are comprehensive and little need be added to what
will be learned from their perusal. As to how they are actually
applied in a prohibition proceeding instituted in the Supreme Court
we quote from a letter from The Honorable Guyte P. McCord, Clerk
of the Supreme Court:
"In practice the Court follows rules 27 and 29 rather strictly.
The suggestion names the judge or official sought to be prohibited as Respondent. Rule 27 allows the suggestor to set
down the suggestion for hearing on any Monday at 9:30 A.M.
provided five days' notice of such application shall have been
given the Respondent and proof thereof filed with the Clerk of
this Court. If the suggestion shows that postponement of the
hearing on the suggestion until the five days' notice is given will
defeat the purpose of the suggestion because the act sought to
be prohibited will have occurred, the Court will hear the suggestion on shorter notice provided the Respondent has as much
notice as the suggestor that the suggestion will be presented at
a certain time. However, counsel for the suggestor should
70

Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 So. 427 (1938); Frederick v. Rowe,
105 Fla. 193, 140 So. 915 (1932).
71
Department of Public Safety v. Koonce, 147 Fla. 616, 3 So.2d 331 (1941);
Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); cf. FLA. STAT. §80.07

(1949).
72

Department of Public Safety v. Koonce, 149 Fla. 2, 5 So.2d 251 (1941);
see Department of Public Safety v. Koonce, 147 Fla. 616, 624, 3 So.2d 3.31, 334

(1941).
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contact the Chief Justice directly or through the Clerk and make
arrangements for a hearing on the shorter notice.
"The rule provides that if the suggestion makes a prima facie
case the Court will issue a rule directed to the inferior court, etc.
However, this should not be understood that the issuance of a
rule nisi is in any sense pro forma. In fact, the principal argument and in most instances the only argument made in the
proceeding is at the time the suggestion is set down for the
issuance of the rule. If the rule issues it is usually made
returnable within ten days and the Respondent should within
that time file such appropriate pleadings as he may deem proper,
including his brief in support thereof. The Relator (suggestor)
is allowed not exceeding ten days to file his brief. When Relator's brief is filed the cause is transmitted by this office to the
Chief Justice for assignment to one of the justices for his study
and opinion or judgment. Then it is circulated to the other
judges of the division unless the matter should be considered
en bane under Rule 1(b)."
The practice before the circuit judges differs slightly, in that they
are prone to issue the alternative writ without notice aind to decide
the matter when the return is presented for consideration.
Attention is called to Section 80.07 of Florida Statutes 1949, which
provides that the rule to show cause "shall be a supersedeas . . .
If the rule is issued because of the alleged personal disqualification of
the respondent circuit judge, it does not operate as a supersedeas of
the proceedings in the circuit court but merely suspends the re73
spondent judge's power to act in such suit.
When the court has issued a writ of prohibition, supersedeas will
be granted on appeal.74 When the writ is denied, the grant of supersedeas is a matter of discretion with the court in most jurisdictions;
but in the exercise of this discretion it will ordinarily grant the supersedeas whenever refusal to do so will render a meritorious appeal
futile and deprive the appellant of the fruits of his appeal if he wins.Th
rel. Bryan v. Albritton, 111 Fla. 142, 149 So. 60 (1933).
U4Peacock v. Miller, 123 Fla. 97, 166 So. 212 (1936).
75
State ex rel. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Wash.
634, 187 Pac. 858 (1920). Contra: Wood v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 50 Cal.
App. 594, 195 Pac. 739 (1920); Gibbs v. Board of Aldermen, 95 Ky. 471, 26
78State ex

S.W. 186 (1894).
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The court should not exercise its discretion until it has examined the
application for supersedeas for the purpose of determining whether
the appeal has merit and whether any substantial right of the appellant will be injured by refusal. If the appeal lacks merit supersedeas
should not be granted, even though denial may virtually dispose of
the appeal and destroy any possibility of its efficacy to the appellant.76
The Florida Supreme Court twice has approved a grant of supersedeas by an inferior tribunal that denied the writ;77 but in neither
case did it give any reason or suggest that supersedeas is not a matter
of right in such instances.
CONCLUSION

The provisions of the Florida Constitution, statutes, and court rules
regarding the writ of prohibition are comparatively clear. The writ
of prohibition guaranteed to the people of Florida by the Constitution is, however, of common law origin, and unfortunately the decisions of the Supreme Court in defining the scope and application of
this extraordinary remedy have frequently been so conflicting or
vague that we are inclined to apply to the entire subject that which
Professor Crandall said of one phase thereof: 78 "The writer regrets
his inability to give the lawyers a rule which would enable them to
tell accurately when and when not the Court will use prohibition to
restrain a court from proceeding .... "
Certain basic factors of the writ stand out, however; and by bearing
in mind the general principles herein gathered from all the Florida
cases dealing with this remedy the practitioner should be able to
utilize prohibition effectively and to avoid the more obvious pitfalls.

76

State ex rel. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Wash. 634,

187 Pac. 358 (1920).
77State ex rel. West's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Cornelius, 108 Fla. 509, 146 So.
554 (1933), cited and followed in Hughes v. Blanton, 120 Fla. 446, 162 So.

914 (1935).
78

CRANDALL, COMMON LAW PRACTICE

373 (Supp. 1940).
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